ABSTRACT Computationally efficient matrix multiplication is a fundamental requirement in various fields, including and particularly in data analytics. To do so, the computation task of large-scale matrix multiplication is typically outsourced to multiple servers. However, due to data misusage at the servers, security is typical of concern. In this paper, we first study the two-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, where a user is interested in the matrix product AB of two finite field private matrices A and B from an information-theoretic perspective. In this problem, the user exploits the computational resources of N servers to compute the matrix product but simultaneously tries to conceal the private matrices from the servers. Our goal is twofold: (i) to maximize the downlink communication rate, and (ii) to minimize the effective number of server observations needed to determine AB, while preserving security, where we allow for up to ≤ N servers to collude. To this end, we propose two schemes -an aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S) and a secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) scheme. For A3S, we optimize the partitioning of matrices A and B in order to either optimize objective (i) or (ii) as a function of the system parameters (e.g., N and ). A proposed inductive approach gives us analytical, close-to-optimal solutions for both (i) and (ii). The SCSA, on the other hand, is shown to be (rate) capacity-optimal for the general J -sided distributed secure matrix multiplication problem J j=1 M j . We show this by developing a recursive information-theoretic upper bound (converse) on the downlink rate for the J -sided secure matrix multiplication problem. With respect to (i), both A3S and SCSA, significantly outperform the state-of-the-art in terms of (a) communication rate, (b) maximum tolerable number of colluding servers, and (c) computational complexity. Overall SCSA (A3S) is the preferred choice when the focus is on the downlink (uplink).
I. INTRODUCTION
In distributed machine learning and scientific computation, matrix multiplication plays an important role. However, in many cases high memory requirements and computational effort is required. Distributed approaches have been used to circumvent computational and memory related barriers of matrix multiplication [1] - [4] . Although distributed matrix multiplication can resolve computational and memory related difficulties, it causes new security problems. In the cryptography literature, different schemes have been proposed that balance security and efficiency of distributed matrix multiplication. Homomorphic encryption, in particular is a form of encryption that allows the computation on ciphertexts,
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constructing an encrypted result which matches the result (after decryption) of the operations directly performed on the plaintext. Bultel et al. [5] suggest partially homomorphic encryption approaches in the framework of MapReduce matrix multiplication. In other related works, cryptographic techniques are applied to the problem of distributed matrix multiplication in cloud computing [6] , [7] .
As opposed to cryptographic techniques, informationtheoretic techniques have been hardly applied to the problem of secure matrix multiplication. In [8] , Nodehi and Maddah-Ali apply information theory to the framework of limited-sharing multi-party computation. In limited-sharing multi-party computation, a set of sources offload the computation task, i.e., computing a polynomial function of input matrices available at the sources, to a set of servers. The result of the computation has to be delivered to a master node.
Our focus in this paper is on optimizing the two conflicting metrics -(i) downlink rate and (ii) recovery threshold. To this end, we propose two novel schemes -an aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S) and a secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) scheme as well as an upper bound (converse) on the downlink rate.
• In A3S, we optimally adjust the matrix partition for the two-sided model to either maximize (i) or minimize (ii). For this purpose, we formulate two optimization problems: (i) one which maximizes the downlink rate and (ii) the other which minimizes the number of effective server needed when computing AB subject to a minimum rate constraint. Both optimization problems find the optimal matrix partition of the matrices A and B. Through an inductive approach, we find analytical, close-to-optimal solutions of the optimization problems. These solutions identify the optimal matrix partition as a function of N and and a minimum rate requirement R th .
• SCSA, on the other hand, is based on a scheme recently proposed by Jia et al. [14] applied in the context of private information retrieval. We adapt this scheme to the general problem of J -sided (J = 2, 3, . . .) distributed secure matrix multiplication J j=1 M j .
• We develop a recursive information-theoretic converse on the downlink rate for the J -sided secure matrix multiplication problem. The bound is based on the capacity of a (J − 1)-sided secure matrix multiplication problem.
= 1 −
J N and SCSA is the capacity-achieving scheme. The rate achieved through A3S, on the other hand, is at most bounded by a factor of 2. However, in comparison to SCSA, A3S requires far less signaling in the uplink and is thus the preferred choice when the incurred uplink costs are non-negligible in comparison to the downlink costs. With respect to objective (i), both A3S and SCSA significantly improve upon the scheme of Chang and Tandon in terms of rate, computational complexity at the servers and the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers. While the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers of the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon is equal to √ N − 1 , our schemes attain a non-zero rate for up to (N −1) 2 colluding servers. Despite of the higher communication rate in comparison to [11] , our scheme attains a lower computational complexity at the servers.
With respect to the achievable downlink rate, GASP codes outperform A3S. This is mainly due to the fact that the deployment of GASP codes in the two-sided model constructs received polynomials p(x) evaluated at x = x i (originating from the i-th server) with gaps in the powers of the base x i which is not the case for A3S. The decoding operation in the GASP case then results in the inversion of a generalized Vandermonde matrix as opposed to the standard Vandermonde matrix inversion for A3S. However, this fact makes the finite field requirements typically more stringent for the GASP scheme than A3S.
B. NOTATION
Throughout this paper, boldface lower-case and capital letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively. Further, for any two integers a, b with a ≤ b, we define [a : b] {a, a + 1, . . . , b} and we denote [1 : b] simply as [b] . Next, we use the short hand r + for max{0, r}. Z refers to the set of all integers, while Z + to the subset of positive integers. Random variables X , Y and Z are said to form a Markov chain denoted by X → Y → Z if p(z|x, y) = p(z|y).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In a fully, or two-sided, secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in computing the matrix product AB of two finite field private matrices 1 A ∈ F m×n and B ∈ F n×p securely (see Fig. 1 ). Hereby, the user has access to a distributed computation system consisting of N honest, but curious computation servers connected to the user by private, error-free links. The user seeks the support of these servers but aims at concealing A and B from the servers. To this end, the user deploys encoding functions f i and g i to generate securely encoded matrices
which are sent to the i-th server. The set of all N encoding functions with respect to matrices A and B are denoted by f = (f 1 , . . . , f N ) and g = (g 1 , . . . , g N ), respectively. Since every server i is by assumption honest, the answer of the i-th server denoted by Z i is a deterministic function 2 ofÃ i andB i , i.e.,
The user has to be able to determine AB after applying the decoding function d(·) on the collection of all N answers Z 1 , . . . , Z N . i.e., AB = d(Z 1 , . . . , Z N ), or informationtheoretically satisfy the decodability constraint
In this paper, we study the (N , ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem. In this setting, security has to be preserved when ≤ N servers may collude. In other words, despite having access to the collection of encoded matricesÃ L and B L , L ⊆ [N ], |L| = , secrecy has to be maintained. Thus, A L andB L do not reveal any information on the private matrices A and B. This is expressed information-theoretically by the security constraint
Next, we define two conflicting metrics -(i) downlink communication rate and (ii) recovery threshold -which we seek to optimize in subsequent sections. Specifically, we aim for maximizing the rate and minimize the recovery threshold.
In almost all cases, the downlink communication rate is loosely referred to as rate. First, we say that the rate R N , is achievable if there exists f , g and d(·) satisfying the decodability and security constraints. The rate R N , is the ratio between the number of desired bits vs. the number of downloaded bits and is thus given by
2 This function is known by the user.
The capacity C N , is the supremum of R N , over all achievable schemes. Second, we call a secure matrix multiplication strategy to be ω N , -securely recoverable if the user can recover the matrix product AB from results of ⊆ [N ], | | = ω N , servers while complying with the security constraint when any combination of ≤ N servers collude. The recovery threshold is the minimum integer ω N , such that the multiplication scheme composed of encoders f , g and decoder d(·) is ω N , -securely recoverable.
In the following two sections, we introduce our two proposed schemes -the aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S) in III and the secure cross subspace alignment scheme (SCSA) in IV.
III. ALIGNED SECRET SHARING SCHEME WITH MATRIX PARTITION
In an (N , ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in computing AB using N servers without revealing colluding servers information about A and B. In our proposed aligned secret sharing scheme, the user breaks A vertically into r A sub-matrices and B horizontally into r B submatrices, i.e.,
Thus, we get A and B by concatenating the sub-matrices
. The number of rows m and n are multiple of r A and r B , respectively. Under the proposed matrix partition, the matrix product is given by
The user encodes the matrices A and B according tõ
, where all entries of matrices K A 1 , . . . , K A ∈ F (m/r A )×n and K B 1 , . . . , K B ∈ F n×(p/r B ) are i.i.d. uniform random variables. These matrices are introduced to conceal the submatrices A j and B k from the servers. Further, the exponents of the x i are carefully chosen to facilitate the alignment of undesired components [15] . Details are discussed in a subsequent paragraph. We may represent the collection of observations VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Number line of the exponent of the polynomial p(x) and its association to the terms
of all colluding servers L = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i } by the equations given at the top of the next page. Given these two equations, the security constraint (3) is satisfied since
where (a) is because the inverses P
−1
A and P −1 B exist. These two inverses exist as P A and P B are the product of diagonal matrices S A and S B and the × Vandermonde matrix P. The diagonal matrices are non-singular when their diagonal elements are all non-zero. Further, the Vandermonde matrix is invertible when the x i j are distinct. A field size |F| ≥ N + 1 is sufficient to ensure the invertibility of P A and P B (see decodability discussions of AB below).
The exponents of the x i are carefully chosen to facilitate the alignment of undesired components [15] . Details are discussed in the next paragraph. The user sends the pair (Ã i ,B i ) to the server where server i in return computes Z i = (Ã i ,B i ) and sends its answer Z i back to the user. The user seeks to retrieve AB by observing up to N values p(
is given by (6) , as shown at the top of the next page.
Alternatively, we may present all N polynomials compactly by
. . .
To reconstruct AB, the user is interested in p 1 (x). The remaining terms p i (x), i = 2, . . . , 4, can be thought of interference. Thus, with respect to p 1 (x) each exponent in x needs to have only one attributable item A j B j to distinguish desired components from each other and also from undesired components K A k B j , A j K B k and K A k K B k . One can verify that each exponent of p 1 (x) does not occur in the remaining undesired terms p i (x), i = 2, . . . , 4. In contrast, there are multiple items assigned to the remaining exponents not being included in p 1 (x). In other words, we align multiple undesired items to single exponents. Through this alignment fewer servers are needed to compute AB securely. Thus, this scheme is called an aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S). A pictorial representation of the association of components to exponents is provided in Fig. 2 . The exponents of x i inÃ i andB i are chosen in the encoding process to avoid overlaps of desired terms (i) with each other and (ii) with undesired terms while simultaneously create as many alignment opportunities as possible when computing Z i =Ã iBi . The desired terms consume r A r B exponents while the interference occupies (r B + 1) + r A − 1 exponents. More specifically, the first (r B − 1) components of p 2 (x) are not aligned with other interference components of p 3 (x) and p 4 (x). In contrast, the remaining r A + 2 − 1 exponents of p 2 (x), p 3 (x) or p 4 (x) are subject to (subspace) alignment of at least two components.
Recall that the polynomial p(x) has a degree of Q N , − 1 and the user has access to N observations. In order to enable decoding, we have to ensure that the degree of the polynomial does not exceed the total number of available servers, or observations, N , i.e.,
Importantly, we need to ensure that any combination p( (7)) has to enable decodability of s. In other words, every Q N , ×Q N , sub-matrix (denoted by D align ) of D align has to be of full rank, or equivalently its determinant det D align being non-zero. Hereby, det D align is the classical Vandermonde determinant 1≤i<j≤Q
which is non-zero in F whenever x ρ j = x ρ i [16] . This is feasible as long as |F| ≥ N + 1. The user can retrieve its desired items in s by polynomial interpolation. Since the user recovers r A r B desired items out of Q N , (r A , r B ) calculated items, the aligned secret sharing scheme achieves a rate of
In order to maximize the rate R N , (r A , r B ), we need to solve the optimization problem
We denote the optimal decision variables and objective value of (9) by (r A , r B ) and R N , . Further, we note that the effective number of server observations the user needs to determine the matrix product AB VOLUME 7, 2019 is Q N , . Thus, the aligned secret sharing strategy is Q N , -securely recoverable. In order to make the aligned secret sharing scheme less prone to slower computing servers, or stragglers, one has to solve the optimization problem
The optimization problems (9) and (10) find the best choice of how to partition the left and right matrices at the user for given N and (and a minimum rate requirement R th ≤ R N , in (10)). For both problems, we propose close-to-optimal analytical solutions. The solutions to the rate maximization problem (9) and the Q N , -secure recoverability problem are stated in Theorem 1 and 3, respectively. To differentiate the (optimal) solution of (10) from (9), we use the breve mark (˘) instead of the star symbol ( ), e.g.,Q N , instead of Q N , .
IV. SECURE CROSS SUBSPACE ALIGNMENT-BASED MATRIX MULTIPLICATION
In addition to the aligned secret sharing scheme, we propose another scheme which aligns undesired components to multiple signaling dimensions. This scheme was recently proposed by Jia et al. in the context of private information retrieval and termed secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) [14] . In the following, we apply this scheme to the context of distributed matrix multiplication. Similarly to the aligned secret sharing scheme, the user applies matrix partitioning with r A = 1 and r r B :
The user encodes matrix A and each sub-matrix B i (destined to the n-th server) individually according to:
where n = r u=1 (u + α n ) and Z ik , Z ik representing i.i.d. noise terms to ensure privacy. α n , n ∈ [N ] is a server-specific finite-field element to ensure decodability. The collectioñ
n } andB n = {B 1n , . . . ,B rn } is then conveyed to the n-th server. This allows server n to compute the answer
with
This expression can be further simplified, namely
Binomial expansion in the form (i + α n ) j = j t=0 j t α t n i (j−t) enables the dispersion of interference terms AZ ij + Z ij B i and Z ik Z im to multiple effective coefficients n α u n for u ∈ [0 : 2 − 1]. Thus, we may reformulate C in compactly as follows
where I ij denotes the sum of interference terms attributed to AZ ij +Z ij B i and Z ik Z im . (The exact form of I ij is of negligible importance in the construction of the achievable scheme.) Thus, the n-th answer the user receives, becomes
If the user has all N answers Z 1 , . . . , Z N available, it can determine all r desired sub-matrices AB i , i = 1, . . . , r as long as the decoding matrix
is full rank. In [14] , the authors show that D cross is in fact full rank when |F| ≥ N +r. Further, it is easy to proof that the security constraint (3) is satisfied.
To maximize the rate, on the one hand, we choose r = N −2 such that
On the other hand, we can flexibly choose r ∈ Z + satisfying R th ≤ r N ≤ 1 − 2 N to adjust the achievable recovery threshold (at the cost of a reduced rate) to
Remark 1 (J -Sided Matrix Multiplication):
In analogy to the construction of the achievable scheme applicable only to the product of two matrices, the scheme can be extended to the computation of J j=1 M j , where M j is the j-th matrix from the left. Choosing the first J − 1 matrices similarly to (11) and M J according to (12) , we can attain a rate of R N , = 1 − J N . The achievable recovery threshold, on the other hand, becomes ω N , = min{r + J , N } with r representing the partition level of M J .
Remark 2: (Analogy to X -Secure T -Private Information Retrieval) In the X -secure T -private information retrieval (XSTPIR) problem [14] , [17] , a user wants to obtain a file
from N servers under two security constraints in terms of (i) file storage at the servers and (ii) private information retrieval of W θ . Specifically, (i) ensures that any set of X colluding servers learn nothing about W [K ] and (ii) that the identity of the requested file W θ is protected from any group of T colluding servers. With respect to (ii), the user sends queries Q [θ ] n to each server n ∈ [N ]. Jia et al. develop a secure cross subspace alignment scheme which is asymptotically (K → ∞) rate optimal. In our work, we adapt this scheme to the problem of distributed matrix multiplication. Specifically, we use the query design Q [θ ] n for the encoding design [cf. (11)] of the unpartitioned left matrix A. Due to the asymmetric nature of the denominator in the objective function of the optimization problem (6), unequal in comparison to equal partitioning is the preferred choice.
V. RATE MAXIMIZATION AND DISCUSSION

Theorem 1:
The solution (r A ,r B ) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization problem (9) for given parameters N and . Hereby,
andr A is the largest possible integer r A ≥ 1 that satisfies the inequality
Proof: The proof is based on the inductive approach of deriving the relationship between consecutive optimal solution pairs (r −1,A , r −1,B ) and (r ,A , r ,B ). Ultimately, under some additional approximations, this helps us in deriving (18) ) Eq. (18) returns a positiver B ∈ Z + . In fact, the overall solution (r A ,r B ) is feasible with respect to the optimization problem (9) . However, for all ∈ [ max + 1 : N ] Eq. (18) givesr B = 0 which violates the constraint (9b). Therefore, Eq. (18) implicitly accounts for the (in)feasibility of (9) for given and N . An infeasible solution translates to a zero rate, or mathematically R N , =R N , = 0. Hereby, R N , denotes the optimal rate of the optimization problem (9) andR N , our proposed estimate.
The best information-theoretic upper bound known of the two-sided matrix multiplication problem on the rate is derived in [11] . The best known upper bound of the two-sided model is in fact the one-sided model for which the capacity is known to be C one-sided
In the following theorem, we improve upon the rate in achievability sense and on the upper bound of the two-sided matrix multiplication problem. This allows us to make information-theoretic optimality claims.
Theorem 2 (Capacity): For the (N , ) two-sided secure matrix multiplication problem (computing AB), where left and right matrices A and B are information-theoretically secured from any ≤ N colluding servers, the capacity is given by
Proof: The capacity-achieving strategy (lower bound) is the cross subspace alignment-based scheme for r = N − 2 (cf. Section IV). The upper bound (converse), on the other hand uses a genie-aided approach. Specifically, by providing both user and the servers with appropriate side information, we can transform the (N , ) two-sided matrix multiplication problem into an one-sided (N − , ) model for which the capacity is already known. For further details, we relegate the reader to Section VII.
Remark 4 (Capacity J -Sided Matrix Multiplication):
From Section IV and Corollary 2 (stated in Section VII), we deduce that the rate capacity of the J -sided (N , ) distributed matrix multiplication problem computing Fig. 3 ). This is illustrated in Fig. 3 when comparing the achievable communication rate of 'Secure Cross Alignment', 'Unequal Partition' and 'Equal Partition' with 'Chang and Tandon' (CT). Specifically, while our schemes ensure a non-zero rate for at most ((N − 1))/(2) colluding servers, CTs scheme support only √ N − 1 colluding servers. Further, with respect to the aligned secret sharing scheme, appropriate matrix partition is of importance when comparing the achievable rates of optimized (or unequal) and equal (r A = r B ) partitions in Fig. 3 . The unequal partitions use the partitioning proposed in Theorem 1. Due to the asymmetric nature of the denominator in the objective function of the optimization problem (9), unequal in comparison to equal partitioning is the preferred choice. Typically, the instances where equal and unequal partitioning produce the same rates are for = 1 and = max .
Remark 6 (Additive Gap):
To evaluate the quality of our proposed analytical solution to the optimization problem (9), we evaluate the maximum additive gap max ∈[N ] |R −R | (see Fig. 4 ). The optimal solution is determined in a bruteforce fashion by exhaustive search which is costly in computation. Numerical results show that the proposed solution is at most 3 · 10 −2 additively off from the optimal solution. 
Remark 7:
Our proposed solution to the optimization problem (9) is frequently the optimal solution. Fig. 5 shows the ratio of the number of sub-optimal solutions of the provided estimation to the number of optimal solutions in the optimization problem (9) for constant N and variable . Proof: For details on the proof, we refer the reader to Appendix C. Remark 8: (Rate Ratio SCSA/A3S in Downlink and Uplink) Fig. 6 illustrates the rate ratio of SCSA vs. A3S for both uplink and downlink. In the downlink, Fig. 6 verifes Corollary 1, i.e., showing that the downlink rate ratio (SCSA/A3S) is upper bounded by 2. However, the improved downlink rate of SCSA over A3S comes at the cost of significantly higher uplink signaling. Thus, SCSA is typically the preferred choice if downlink costs outweigh uplink costs.
Remark 9: (Server Computational Complexity) We define the per-server computational complexity as the number of necessary multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations to determine Z i =Ã iBi . Clearly, the MAC complexity under a general r A and r B -partition of matrices A and B becomes mnp r A r B . Recall that the denominator r A r B < N represents the dimension reserved for desired sub-block matrix products. For constant N and , our aligned secret sharing scheme achieves (in comparison to CTs scheme) the better alignment efficiency and thus a larger product r A r B . On the other hand, when neglecting the (mp) additions in the cross subspace alignment scheme [cf. Eq. (13)], this scheme typically produces the largest product r A r B = N −2 (r A = 1 and r B = N − 2 ). This in return, results in improved perserver complexities of our proposed schemes (in comparison to CTs scheme) when m, n and p remain constant.
Remark 10 (User Decoding Complexity): In the aligned secret sharing scheme, the decoding at the user can be interpreted as an interpolation of a Q − 1-degree polynomial for mp r A r B times. Hereby, the complexity of a t-degree polynomial interpolation is O(t log 2 t log log t) [18] . Thus, the decoding complexity at the user is of order O(mp log 2 η log log η) with η = max{r A , } r B .
Remark 11 (Recovery Threshold): In the aligned secret sharing scheme, the effective number of server observations the user needs to determine the matrix product AB is (after rate maximization) Q . In the problem (9), it is desirable to choose r A and r B as large as possible without violating the inequality constraint Q ≤ N . Typically, after rate maximization we obtain highly straggler-dependent solutions for which Q ≈ N . Similarly, in the cross subspace alignment scheme the achievable recovery maximization is exactly N when maximizing the rate.
Remark 12 (Input Matrix Dimension):
Recall that in the aligned secret sharing scheme the user splits the input matrices A and B into r A sub-matrices A i ∈ F (m/r A )×n and r B submatrices B j ∈ F n×(p/r B ) . According to Theorem 1, we can easily show from (18) 
This suggests that for feasibility in the matrix partitioning, p and m shall (at least) scale according to ( N ) and ( √ N ), respectively.
VI. ACHIEVABLE RECOVERY THRESHOLD AND DISCUSSION
Theorem 3: The solution (
• r A ,
• r B ) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization problem (10) for a given parameter R th which is feasible with respect to the given parameters N und . Hereby, Proof: The proof is based on comparision with the optimization problem (1). For more details we refer the reader to Appendix B.
Remark 13: We measure the accuracy of our solution for (10) by considering the maximum relative gap Fig. 7 ). Hereby,Q R th , and
• Q R th , are, respectively, the optimal and according to Theorem 3 the proposed achievable recovery threshold. Numerical results show that the relative gap is at most 0.14. With respect to R th , we use in the numerical simulation 100 equidistant values within the interval [(R N , )/(100, R N , )] for every given pair (N , ). The gap of 0.14 is typically of no concern since the ratio of sub-optimal solutions is less than 0.025 for arbitrary N (see Fig. 8 ). (10) for N = 80, = 8 and R th ∈ {0.14, 0.28, 0.42}. As R th increases, condition (10a) becomes more restrictive which causes the feasible region to decrease. Remark 14: (A3S vs. SCSA) As shown in Fig. 9 , SCSA attains a lower achievable recovery threshold than A3S. However, in A3S relatively high R th have a very restrictive effect on the feasible (r A , r B )-region (cf. condition 10a and Fig. 10 ). This is the main reason why the recovery threshold ratio (A3S/SCSA) increases and the uplink advantage of A3S over SCSA decays for larger R th .
VII. CONVERSE (UPPER BOUND ON THE RATE)
In the sequel, we apply a genie-aided upper bound by providing both the user and servers with additional side information. Through this technique, we transform a two-sided (N , ) matrix multiplication problem into a relaxed setting, an one-sided (N − , ) model. To distinguish the encoding matrices and answers of the one-sided model from the twosided, we reserve the ' • ' notation solely for the one-sided model (e.g.,
Without loss of generality, we assume that the expected number of downloaded bits from each server is of the same value. Further, consider the case where the set of non-colluding servers L C has a smaller cardinality than the set of colluding servers L |L C | = N − ≥ = |L| . Let us now elaborate on the construction of the genie. We provide (i) the user with the collection of answers
Further, we give all servers (ii) B L and (iii) the matrix B.
we know by the data processing inequality that
and the nonnegativity of mutual information, one car infer that
and (23), we conclude that I (AB; Z L ) = 0 or equivalently H (AB) = H (AB|Z L ). Thus, the user can only decode AB if it obtains the answers
. This is why we end up at the relaxed setting which is the one-sided distributed matrix multiplication problem with N − servers out which collude. This is mainly because the matrix B is now a public matrix. We thus obtain, the following general upper bound on the two-sided matrix multiplication problem
where in (a), we used C one-sided
Corollary 2:
The rate capacity for the J -sided (N , ) secure distributed matrix multiplication problem computing
Proof: Proof by induction. The base cases for J ∈ {1, 2} readily follow from [11, Theorem 1] and (24), respectively. Constructing the genie similarly to the two-sided case (J = 2), we can easily show that
Now we apply this bound successively for N ≥ J , i.e.,
This finalizes the proof.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied the secure matrix multiplication problem, where a user is interested in the matrix product AB of two private matrices A and B. The user tries to conceal the private matrices from N honest servers (where we allow for up to servers to collude), but uses them to compute the matrix product. We propose two schemes -a partition-based aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S) and a secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) scheme. For A3S, we formulate and solve two optimization problems that determine the optimal matrix partition of input matrices A and B to (i) maximize the communication rate of this scheme and (ii) to maximize the recovery threshold. By developing a novel converse bound, we show that SCSA is not only information-theoretically rate-optimal for the two-sided secure matrix multiplication but also for the general J -sided case J j=1 M j . However, the uplink overhead for SCSA is significantly higher than for A3S. With respect to objective (i), numerical results show that A3S and SCSA significantly outperform the scheme of Chang and Tandon presented in [11] . In summary, our work shows that appropriate matrix partition is of importance in enabling uplink and downlink rate-efficient, straggler-robust and secure distributed matrix computation. Interesting open problems to study are amongst others the distributed secure matrix multiplication problem in case of heterogeneous (e.g., different processing capabilities) or adversarial (Byzantine) servers.
APPENDICES A CLOSE-TO-OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM (9)
Next, we propose a close-to-optimal solution to the optimization problem (9) . To establish this solution, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: For every optimal solution of the optimization problem (9) , there is at least one maximizing pair denoted by (r A , r B ) which satisfies r A ≥ r B .
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Suppose that the maximizing pair (r A , r B ) satisfies r A < r B . The associated number of exploited servers is then given by
On the other hand, the associated number of exploited servers for the inverted pair (r B , r A ) corresponds to
We infer from inequality (26) that the inverted pair (r B , r A ) attains a higher rate than (r A , r B ). This is in contradiction with the assumption that (r A , r B ) is a maximizing pair.
Lemma 2:
and N ≥ 3, (r A , r B ) = (1, 1) is an unique maximizing pair of the optimization problem (9) .
Proof:
We set (r A , r B ) = (1 + a, 1 + b) , where a, b ∈ Z + ∪ {0}, such that the number of exploited servers equals
The only feasible pair (a, b) satisfying the inequality constraint of the optimization problem (9) is (a, b) = (0, 0). Therefore the only maximizing pair of the optimization problem (9) , r B ) of the optimization problem 9 satisfies the strong feasibility condition.
Proof: The rate for any pair (r A , r B ) ∈ Z + 2 is given by
Suppose by contradiction that the maximizing pair (r A , r B ) is not strongly feasible, i.e., it does not satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 3. Thus, r A or r B can be increased to values above r A or r B without violating the inequality constraint of the optimization problem. An increase of r A or r B leads to an increase in the rate (cf. Eq. 27). This contradicts that (r A , r B ) is a maximizing pair of the optimization problem 9. Lemma 4: Let (r A , r B ) be a strongly feasible pair. When decreases by one ( ← − 1) and we simultaneously increase r A by one (r A ← r A + 1) while keeping r B constant (i) has no effect on the number of exploited servers and keeps it atQ Q (r A , r B ), (ii) generates a new strongly feasible pair (r A + 1, r B ) at − 1 and (iii) increases the rate additively by (r 1,A , r 1,B ) .
(28) VOLUME 7, 2019 From Q 2 = Q 1 , (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4 readily follow. The rate associated with the pair r 2,A , r 2,B then becomes (r 1,A , r 1,B ) and (r 2,A , r 2,B ) . The additive increase in the rate for the pair (r 2,A , r 2,B ) is larger than for the pair (r 1,A , r 1,B ) .
Proof: We have r 1,A + 1 ≥ r 1,B , so that Therefore, strong feasibility along with above observation suggests that Q is at least N −r 1,B . We remind the reader that as long as Q < N − r 1,B , the strong feasibility assumption is violated. As a result, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r 1,A , r 1,B ) is lower bounded according to
On the other hand, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r 2,A , r 2,B ) is bounded from above by A , r 2,B ) . 
We denote the rate increase from the rate pairr 1 
Similarly, we can approximateQ m−1 by the same approach such that
Subtracting (42) from (41) giveŝ
From the Equations 39 and 43d m is given bŷ Fig. 11 ) 
Due to Lemma 1, we choose the smallest m that satisfies (46). This gives usr
for ∈ (ˆ m+1 ,ˆ m ] with ∈ Z + . By using the ceiling function, the values ofr ,B which do not correspond to integer numbers are removed for integers . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDICES B CLOSE-TO-OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM (10)
In the following, we derive Theorem 3. For the sake of clarity, before stating the subsequent lemma on which Theorem 3 is based on, we introduce some notation. Namely, for given feasible parameters R th and of (10), we denote the optimal decision variables and their respective objective value byȓ = (ȓ A ,ȓ B ) andQ, respectively. Further,Ȓ R th , represents the rate attained through the partitioningȓ. 6 Similarly, for optimization problem (9) , R Q , and r = (r A , r B ) are respectively, the objective value and the optimal decision variables when N =Q.
The proposed solution in Theorem 3 uses previous results (18)-(19) of the rate maximization problem (9) . Specifically, for parameters N =Q and , R Q , ≈ R th holds which allows us to use the solution in Theorem 1 to derive Theorem 3. The following lemma justifies our approximation R Q , ≈ R th . Lemma 7: For given parameters N =Q and , the optimal solutions of the optimization problems (9) and (10) satisfy the following inequalities:
Proof: First, we consider (48). Let us verify that the following two conflicting cases are not true:
<Ȓ R th , : The constraints (10b) and (10c) hold forȓ and N =Q. Thus, the constraints (9a) and (9b) also hold forȓ and N =Q. Consequently,Ȓ R th , is a feasible solution of the optimization problem (9) . However, R Q , <Ȓ R th , violates the assumption of optimality of R Q , .
(ii) R Q ,
(1 − (1)/(r A )) >Ȓ R th , : The constraints (9a) and (9b) hold for r and N =Q. Therefore the constrains (10a), (10b) and (10c) hold for r and every N ≥Q. From the optimization problem (10) with N =Q, the following subcases have to be considered:
• Q <Q: This sub-case violates the optimality ofQ.
• Q =Q: The pair (r A − 1, r B ) is also a solution to the optimization problem (10) , since the corresponding rate 6 Naturally, due to (10a),Ȓ R th , ≥ R th .
of this pair is given by
However, this violates the optimality ofQ. Due to the violation of conditions (i) and (ii), (48) readily follows. In order to show (49), we follow a similar line of argument as for (48) with the slight difference that we now use the solutionȓ of the optimization problem (10) . Next, we show that the following two cases (violating (49)) are infeasible:
•Ȓ R th , < R th : This case violates (10a).
•Ȓ R th , (1 − (1)/(ȓ A )) > R th : This violatesQ being minimal, since the pair (ȓ A − 1,ȓ B ) would under this condition produce a smaller objective value. This concludes the lemma.
Combining (48) and (49), we get
From (50), we infer the approximation R th ≈ R
. This approximation is sufficiently accurate for both small and large r A . For instance, small r A are usually associated to large ≈ max where the rate R Q , is close to zero. The approximation R th ≈ R Q , , allows us to utilize the optimization problem (9) for solving (10) . In other words, instead of directly solving the optimization problem (10) for given parameters N , and R th , we use the 'detour' of finding the smallest associated Q for and R Q , ≈ R th in the optimization problem (9) . For this detour, the smallest associated Q for and R Q , ≈ R th becomes the approximation ofQ. We find the smallest Q by finding the respective r A and r B with colluding servers and a rate R Q , ≈ R th in (9) . We start with r B . Hereby, we denote r B with relaxed integer assumption on by m (for more information we refer the reader to Section VIII). In the sequel of this section, ( • ) is used to indicate approximations. From Eq. (44) we havê 
Recall from Section VIII that as decreases from max to min , m remains constant in certain intervals of . The extent to which the rate changes as decreases is given by the ratio 
From (51) and (52), we obtain 
Due to the Lemma 1, we choose the smallest m that satisfies (57). This gives us 
APPENDICES C MULTIPLICATIVE GAP: SCSA AND A3S
In connection with the aligned secret sharing scheme (A3S), we consider two regions with respect to the parameter ≤ max for which the optimal r = (r ,A , r ,B ) corresponds to:
• r ,A arbitrary, r ,B = 1 for ∈ [ : max ],
• and r ,A arbitrary and r ,B > 1 for ∈ [1 : − 1]. Hereby, represents the smallest for which r ,B = 1. Next, we consider the rate ratio (R SCSA N , )/(R A3S N , ), where R SCSA N , and R A3S N , denote, respectively, the optimal rates for the SCSA and A3S schemes for given parameters (N , ). We start considering the ratio for the first region. To this end, we find a lower bound on R A3S N , in Region (i). 
where the steps in (59) are explained as follows:
•
Step (e) is a direct consequence of r being feasible, i.e., satisfying Q (r ) ≤ N .
• Step (f ) follows from r ,B = 1.
• Step (g) is the analytical solution in r ,A subject to the constraint Q (r ,A , r ,B = 1) ≤ N . Now, we use the lower bound (59) on R A3S N , to find an upper bound on the rate ratio. 
